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DOUGLAS v. WILLCUTS TODAY:
THE INCOME TAX PROBLEMS
OF USING ALIMONY TRUSTS
Alan Gunnt
Using a trust to satisfy a husband's' obligation to support his
wife after divorce2 can be an appealing compromise between the
husband's transferring property to his wife and his assuming an
obligation to make alimony payments. As in the case of a property
settlement, the wife who receives alimony from a trust knows she
will receive her payments without regard to her husband's continu-
ing solvency and willingness to sign alimony checks. As in the case
of alimony, the husband who creates a trust to support his wife
need part with no greater interest in his property than is needed to
support her until she dies or remarries.3 But because the creation
of a trust in connection with divorce resembles both a property
settlement and an agreement to pay alimony, the principles de-
veloped in the "pure" property settlement and alimony cases do
not easily answer the tax questions raised by the use of these trusts.
The first problem the courts faced in dealing with alimony
trusts was whether to tax the trust income to the husband or to the
wife. A series of Supreme Court decisions, beginning in 1935 with
Douglas v. Willcuts, 4 taxed whichever spouse the court felt had "ben-
efited" from that income. This line of case law proved unsatisfac-
tory and was overruled by Congress in 1942, in the predecessors of
t Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. B.S. 1961, Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute; J.D. 1970, Cornell Law School.
' As in the Code, "husband" may mean "wife," "former wife," or "former husband,"
and "wife" may mean anything "husband" may mean. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(17). All section
references in this Article, except as otherwise indicated, are to the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954.
2 Or legal separation (§ 71(a)(1)), or separation under a written separation agreement
(§ 71(a)(2)). Unlike sections 71(a)(1) and 71(a)(2), section 71(a)(3) (providing for alimony
treatment of periodic payments received under a decree for support) seems not to apply to
alimony trusts, since that section does not expressly refer to payments "attributable to
property transferred."
3 For a more detailed discussion of some of the non-tax considerations involved in
establishing an alimony trust, see Peschel, Income Taxation of Alimony Payments Attributable to
Transferred Property: Congressional Confusion, 44 TUL. L. REv. 223, 223-25 (1970).
4 296 U.S. 1 (1935).
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sections 71 and 682. 5 But the 1942 legislation was both incomplete
and ambiguous. It left in its wake three fundamental questions: (1)
whether a wife who receives trust payments meeting the require-
ments of section 71 is taxed in full on those payments, or taxed
only on payments characterized as distributions of trust income
under the trust conduit rules;6 (2) whether the husband or the wife
is taxed on the income of a trust created as part of a divorce
settlement but not complying with the conditions of section 71;7
and (3) whether the transfer of property to an alimony trust is a
5 Section 71(a)(1) provides:
(1) Decree of divorce or separate maintenance
If a wife is divorced or legally separated from her husband under a decree of
divorce or of separate maintenance, the wife's gross income includes periodic
payments (whether or not made at regular intervals) received after such decree in
discharge of (or attributable to property transferred, in trust or otherwise, in discharge
of) a legal obligation which, because of the marital or family relationship, is im-
posed on or incurred by the husband under the decree or under a written in-
strument incident to such divorce or separation.
I.R.C. § 71(a)(1) (emphasis added).
Section 71(a)(2) is similar to section 71(a)(1), except that it applies to payments made
under a written separation agreement, unless the separated spouses file a joint return.
Section 682 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Inclusion in gross income of wife
There shall be included in the gross income of a wife who is divorced or
legally separated under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance (or who is
separated from her husband under a written separation agreement) the amount of
the income of any trust which such wife is entitled to receive and which, except
for this section, would be includible in the gross income of her husband, and such
amount shall not, despite any other provision of this subtitle, be includible in the
gross income of such husband....
(b) Wife considered a beneficiary
For purposes of computing the taxable income of the estate or trust and the
taxable income of a wife to whom subsection (a) or section 71 applies, such wife
shall be considered as the beneficiary specified in this part. A periodic payment
under section 71 to any portion of which this part applies shall be included in the
gross income of the beneficiary in the taxable year in which under this part such
portion is required to be included.
Note that § 682(a) does not apply to alimony trusts (trusts to which § 71(a) applies)
because § 682(a) applies only to trusts whose income would, but for that section, be taxed
to the husband. Because § 7 1(d) provides that the husband is not taxed on the income of a
§ 71 trust, the first requirement of § 682(a) is not met. Section 682(b), however, does apply
to alimony trusts, although in a very limited way. See text accompanying notes 9-45 infra.
Sections 71 and 682 are substantially identical to their predecessors, §§ 22(k) and 171,
respectively, of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-
753, § 120, 56 Stat. 798. Accordingly, hereinafter "section 71" will mean either § 71 or its
predecessor, and "section 682" will be used similarly.
' See text accompanying notes 9-50 infra. The trust conduit rules connect payments by
trusts to particular items of trust property or income. I.R.C. §§ 641-668.
7 See text accompanying notes 51-69 infra.
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taxable event, requiring the transferor to pay tax on accumulated
gain." The courts and the Service, insensitive to the history of the
1942 legislation and reluctant to discard the "benefit" theory of
Douglas v. Willcuts, have failed to provide satisfactory answers.
I
TAXATION OF PAYMENTS FROM A
SECTION 71 ALIMONY TRUST
A. The Problem
A wife must include in her gross income all alimony paid di-
rectly by her husband, whether or not the husband pays out of or
even has any taxable income.9 But when payments are made from
a section 71 alimony trust-a trust established or transferred as
part of a divorce settlement and making periodic payments satisfy-
ing section 71's definition of "alimony"--courts disagree over
whether the wife must include all such payments in her income, or
is taxable only "as a beneficiary" of the trust, so that she need not
include payments out of trust corpus or tax-exempt trust income. 10
Were alimony trusts governed solely by section 71, trust pay-
ments would be fully includible in the wife's income; section 71
8 See text accompanying notes 70-112 infra.
9 Neeman v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 864 (1956), affd mem., 255 F.2d 841 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 841 (1958). The taxpayer in Neeman contended that because her husband's
gross income was less than his deductions for items other than his alimony payments, these
alimony payments were "out of" her husband's tax-exempt interest income. Accordingly,
argued the taxpayer, the payments should not be taxable to her since her husband received
no benefit from the alimony deduction. The Tax Court held that whether the payments
came out of the husband's taxable income was immaterial, and that taxing the wife on
alimony where the payments did not reduce the husband's tax burden was both constitu-
tional and consistent with the statute.
10 Unless there is a rule that connects a payment to a particular income item (as do the
trust conduit rules, §§ 641-668), it is almost meaningless to say that a payment is "out of
[some particular] income." To be sure, it might be possible to trace the cash used to make a
payment to the cash received in an income-producing transaction, but this hardly justifies
saying that the payment was "out of that income." There is no difference between a tax-
payer who receives $1,000 in cash in an income-producing transaction and pays that cash
to his wife, and a taxpayer who receives the same cash, in the same transaction, and pays a
different $1,000 to his wife. Therefore, only where the amount of a payment depends
upon the amount of income the payor has received (e.g., a husband agrees to pay his wife
an amount equal to half the income from some specified property), or where the statute
provides a tracing rule, as the trust provisions do, does it make sense to refer to payments
"out of income." The phrase is a handy one, however, and I shall use it from time to time
in connection with trust payments as shorthand for "payments that are treated as payments
of income under the trust conduit rules."
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provides that the "wife's gross income includes periodic payments,"
and draws no distinction between direct payments and trust pay-
ments. But payments by alimony trusts are also subject to section
682(b), which provides that for purposes of computing her tax-
able income, the wife "shall be considered as the beneficiary [of the
trust]." Applied literally to a wife receiving payments from an
alimony trust," section 682(b) would tax her on trust payments only
to the extent they constitute distributions of taxable income under
the trust conduit rules. The regulations 12 provide, however, with
ample support in the legislative history,13 that the full amount of
any payment from an alimony trust is taxable to the wife. 14 The
principal function of section 682(b) is to subject alimony trust pay-
ments to the timing rules applicable to income from ordinary
trusts;1 5 section 682(b) was not, despite its sweeping language, in-
" In this section, "alimony trust" means "a trust making payments that are treated as
alimony under § 71." In the next section it will be necessary to distinguish these trusts
("section 71 alimony trusts") from trusts created in connection with divorce that make
payments not subject to § 71 ("non-section 71" alimony trusts).
12 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.71-1(c)(3), 1.682(a)-l(a)(2) (1957).
13 S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83-84 (1942).
14 The husband gets no deduction for the payments (see note 47 infra) but § 71(d)
excludes them from his income, a rule that leads to virtually the same result as an inclusion
in income followed by an offsetting deduction, at least in the common case in which the
trust distributes only ordinary income to the wife. Only in the few cases in which the
husband's gross income is material (see, e.g., § 6501(e)(1)(A) (where taxpayer fails to report
amount exceeding 25% of his stated gross income, statute of limitation becomes six years
instead of three)), or where the parties have been so foolish as to create an alimony trust
making payments out of something other than the trust's ordinary income, will the differ-
ence between an exclusion from the husband's income and a deduction matter. See notes
47-48 and accompanying text infra.
Until 1976, the exclusion of alimony trust income from the husband's income meant
that, other things being equal, the creator of an alimony trust would have a lower adjilsted
gross income than a husband paying alimony directly, since alimony was an itemized de-
duction. This meant, for example, that a husband could not deduct direct alimony and
take the standard deduction. Section 62(13) now makes alimony an "above the line" deduc-
tion.
15 S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1942). The wife receiving direct alimony
realizes income when she "receives" each payment, according to the usual tax-accounting
rules for cash-method taxpayers; the wife entitled to payments from an alimony trust re-
ports income when the payments are "required to be distributed, whether distributed or
not." I.R.C. §§ 652(a), 662(a).
Two functions other than timing are performed by § 682(b)'s description of the wife as
a "beneficiary." One is to allow the trust a deduction under § 651 or § 661. See, e.g.,
Laughlin's Estate v. Commissioner, 167 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1948); G.C.M. 25999, 1949-1
C.B. 116, declared obsolete, Rev. Rul. 67-406, 1967-2 C.B. 420. The Service has declared that
the wife is "treated as a beneficiary under section 682(b) of the Code merely for the pur-
poses of computing the taxable income of the trust and determining the taxable year in
which the alimony payments are to be included in her gross income." Rev. Rul. 65-283,
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tended to make the wife taxable only "as a beneficiary.' 6
In spite of section 71, the regulations, and the legislative his-
tory, two courts have held that distributions of tax-exempt bond
interest from an alimony trust are not taxable to the wife. In
Stewart v. Commissioner,'7 the Tax Court held that, because the wife
was a "beneficiary" under section 682(b), there was "no doubt" that
the portion of her payments treated as tax-exempt income under
the trust conduit rules was not taxable.18 The Stewart opinion de-
voted only one paragraph to this issue, and cited neither the regu-
lations nor the legislative history; it hardly qualifies as a definitive
rejection of the regulations. A more complete discussion of the
legislative history of section 682(b) (but not, inexplicably, of the
regulations) was undertaken by the Sixth Circuit in Ellis v. United
States. 9 The Ellis court also relied on section 682(b) to hold dis-
tributions of tax-exempt income not taxable to an alimony trust
beneficiary. The opinion brushed the legislative history of the
alimony trust provisions aside, noting that the committee reports
expressly require inclusion of corpus distributions in income but
say nothing about tax-exempt interest.20 An understanding of the
error of the Ellis case requires a reasonably firm grasp of the his-
tory of sections 71 and 682.
B. The Law Before 1942
In 1917, the Supreme Court held in Gould v. Gould21 that
alimony was not income to the wife who received it, and observed
that the husband could not deduct the payments. 22 Although virtu-
ally devoid of reasoning, Gould at least harmonized with the treat-
ment of analogous situations. Since a married wife was not taxed
when she received support, it was not wholly irrational to extend
1965-2 C.B. 25, 28. The other function of § 682(b), according to Proposed Treas. Reg. §
1.682(b)-l(a), 35 Fed. Reg. 19,757 (1970), is to subject a wife who is treated "as the
beneficiary" of a trust under § 682(b) to § 56's minimum tax on tax preferences where the
trust has tax-preference items. This proposed regulation is unsound, as applied to § 71
trusts, since the wife who must treat alimony trust payments as ordinary income in full
receives no benefit from the trust's tax preference items, and so should not be subject to
the tax imposed by § 56.
16 See note 40, notes 42-45 and accompanying text infra.
7 9 T.C. 195 (1947), acq. 1947-2 C.B. 4, acq. withdrawn and nonacq. 1965-2 C.B. 7.
8 Id. at 198-99.
19 416 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1969).
20 Id. at 896-97.
21 245 U.S. 151 (1917).
22 Id. at 154.
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this treatment to a divorced wife. 23 Even today, something very like
the rule in Gould applies to payments not taxable to a wife under
section 71.24
Given Gould, how was the income of an alimony trust to be
taxed? Had it viewed the "alimony" aspect of the alimony trust
as controlling, the Court might simply have held the income of
all alimony trusts taxable to the grantor on the ground that the
difference between direct payment and payment by means of a
trust was not substantial enough to justify a difference in tax
treatment.2 5 Instead, the Court emphasized the "property transfer"
element of the alimony trust and held the husband taxable on trust
income paid to the wife only if the trust payments satisfied a sup-
port obligation that survived the divorce and the creation of the
trust. The Court first dealt with this problem in Douglas v.
Willcuts, 26 in which it held the grantor of an alimony trust taxable
on its income because "through the discharge of his obligation [he]
enjoys the benefit of the income as though he had personally re-
ceived it."'27
The Douglas opinion might have been read as holding that the
income of all alimony trusts was taxable to the grantor.28 In three
cases decided in 1940, however, the Court held that the choice of
2' An appropriate analogy here is the tax treatment of damages, which are usually
taxed like the items they replace. E.g., Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d
110 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944). Alimony can be regarded as a substitute for
the various non-taxable benefits one receives as a result of being married. But the Supreme
Court did not use this reasoning (or, for that matter, any other) in Gould.
24 Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63, holds that a wife who receives property "in ex-
change for" a release of marital rights has no income. The ruling also holds that the wife's
basis is the value of the property at the time of the transfer. See Farid-Es-Sultaneh v.
Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947).
25 See Surrey, The Supreme Court and the Federal Income Tax: Some Implications of the Re-
cent Decisions, 35 ILL. L. REV. 779, 809 (1941).
26 296 U.S. 1 (1935).
27 Id. at 10.
28 The quotation in the previous paragraph suggests the rule that eventually de-
veloped, but another part of the Douglas opinion could have been read as making the
income of any alimony trust taxable to the husband. The Court noted that non-trust
alimony was not income to the wife, that the payments from the trust in question were "to
serve the purpose of alimony," and that the divorce decree "imposed upon petitioner the
obligation to devote the income in question, through the -medium of the trust, to the use of
his divorced wife." 296 U.S. at 8-9. None of these statements seems to distinguish "com-
plete discharge" trusts from others, and all could support the possibility mentioned in the
text.
The problems courts faced in applying Douglas are discussed in Paul, Five'Years with
Douglas v. Willcuts, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1939).
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the person taxable on the trust income depended upon local law
and the terms of the agreement establishing the trust. In Helvering
v. Fuller,2 9 the grantor escaped taxation on the theory that, because
the Nevada divorce court had no power to modify the trust it had
approved and the husband had not guaranteed the trust payments,
the divorce and the creation of a trust left him with no continuing
obligation. Absent such an obligation, the husband derived no
benefit from the payments and thus was not taxable on them. But
Helvering v. Leonard30 and Helvering v. Fitch3 1 held that a husband
who guaranteed trust payments, or who failed to prove that local
law could not someday compel him to make additional payments,
was taxable on the trust income because of his continuing (though
contingent 32) support obligation. 33
The rule apparently established by Fuller, Leonard, and Fitch
allowed a husband to avoid taxation on the income of an alimony
trust only if he could show34 that he had completely discharged his
obligation to support his wife by establishing the trust. This test was
29 310 U.S. 69 (1940).
30 310 U.S. 80 (1940) (decided the same day as Fuller).
31 309 U.S. 149 (1940).
32 Helvering v. Leonard, 310 U.S. at 84.
33 Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U.S. at 156; Helvering v. Leonard, 310 U.S. at 84-85. In
Fuller, the husband had agreed to make payments in addition to those to be made from the
trust. 310 U.S. at 71. This did not make him liable for tax on trust income. Id. at 73. The
"continuing obligation" necessary to make the husband taxable on trust income had to be
an obligation discharged by the trust income (id. at 75-76); thus an agreement to pay the
wife $100 a month in addition to the trust payments would not be "continuing obligation
[as to the trust payments]" (id. at 73), while an agreement to pay her the difference be-
tween $100 a month and the trust income would be (id. at 75). The effect of this rule,
together with that of Leonard, was that a husband committed to future payments in addi-
tion to those made by the trust was not taxed on the trust income, but one with a wholly
contingent duty to make payments was so taxed. The distinction drawn by these cases is
tonsistent with "continuing obligation" theory, which reasoned that generation of income
by the trust benefits the guaranteeing husband by relieving him of the necessity of satisfy-
ing the guarantee, while the husband who creates a "complete discharge" trust loses inter-
est in whether the trust earns income, and so receives no benefit when the income is
earned. As a theory, this is splendidly tidy, but if the "continuing obligation" trust is
adequately funded the difference may be of no practical importance whatever. See note 37
infra.
ULeonard required the husband to establish by "clear and convincing proof" that his
obligation had been terminated; if local law was unclear, he was taxed. 310 U.S. at 84-87.
This presumption is inconsistent with current views about determining local law in federal
tax cases. Today, a federal court not bound by a ruling of the state's highest court must
simply determine local law to the best of its ability. Neither party bears the risk of state law
uncertainty. See Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967). In Pearce v.
Commissioner, 315 U.S. 543 (1942), the "husband-must-prove-discharge" theory was car-
ried to its logical conclusion that the wife would not be taxed on the trust income if local
law was obscure.
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part of the "existing law" that Congress undertook to overrule in
1942; it remains the test used by the Service to identify the person
taxable on the income of a trust created in connection with divorce
but not covered by section 71.35
C. The 1942 Legislation
Congress enacted section 71 in 1942 primarily to overrule
Gould v. Gould and render nontrust alimony taxable to the wife
and deductible by the husband. Financing the war effort required a
dramatic increase in tax rates, and Gould v. Gould could have
caused divorced husbands severe hardship. It was possible that
the husband's taxes and nondeductible alimony payments could
exceed his income.3 6 Congress also hoped to solve two problems
created by Douglas v. Willcuts and its progeny. The first was "geo-
graphic discrimination"-under the Douglas line of cases a couple
" Rev. Rul. 74-94, 1974-1 C.B. 26, discussed in text accompanying notes 60-62 infra.
The ruling cites Fuller and Fitch, but not Pearce v. Commissioner, 315 U.S. 543 (1942), and
it requires the grantor to establish the requisite local law by "clear and convincing proof."
But see Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S 456 (1967).
Pearce suggests that the Court might have resolved the Douglas v. Willcuts problem on
its own. Pearce involved an annuity contract, but applied to transfers in trust as well; both
the majority and Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, treated the case as one requiring applica-
tion of the rules of the trust cases. The Supreme Court held that the wife was taxable on
the annuity payments unless she could make some showing that the divorce court retained
the power to amend the annuity contract or control the income from it; power to require
the husband to make additional payments was not enough to make the annuity income
taxable to the husband. 315 U.S. at 552-53. This was plainly inconsistent with Fitch and
Leonard, as Justice Frankfurter noted. Id. at 557-58. The majority insisted that the trust in
Fitch was modifiable (id. at 550), and distinguished Leonard by describing the trust in that
case as merely "security" for the husband's continuing obligation (id. at 552), although in
Leonard the Court had described the husband's obligation to make additional payments as
"wholly contingent" (310 U.S. at 84). The Court's attempt to decide this question by creat-
ing arbitrary categories of "security" and "non-security" trusts (315 U.S. at 552) made the
law after Pearce arbitrary and uncertain. Had the Court simply overruled Leonard, however,
it would have held the income of all irrevocable alimony trusts taxable to the wife, a result
roughly consistent with the post-1942 rules for direct alimony payments. Pearce was de-
cided too late to be considered by Congress.
"; The Revenue Act of 1942 imposed surtax rates of up to 82%. Revenue Act of 1942,
Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 103, 56 Stat. 798. The possible effect of such tax rates upon a hus-
band paying 50% of his income in nondeductible alimony is obvious. See Peschel, supra
note 3, at 225-26. This concern for the husband appeared most clearly in the testimony of
Randolph Paul, Tax Adviser to the Secretary of the Treasury, in the House Ways and
Means Committee hearings. See 1 Revenue Revision of 1942: Hearings Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 80, 92 (1942). Not all the testimony addressed con-
siderations of sound tax policy. Witness the appalling exchange between Benjamin A.
Javits, a New York lawyer who thought the proposed legislation would make it financially
attractive to break up the home, and Congressman Dingell, who considered alimony an
"infernal racket" which enriched unscrupulous wives. 2 id. at 2157-67.
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could choose to establish an alimony trust the income of which was
taxable to the wife only if they could obtain their divorce in a state
whose law permitted a divorce settlement to terminate the hus-
band's support obligation. The second was uncertainty-the Doug-
las case bred litigation, as the husband's ability to get a "complete
discharge" was often unclear. 7
In 1941, the Senate had proposed to solve the Douglas problem
by taxing as a beneficiary any divorced wife receiving payments
from a trust, under a provision similar in wording to section 682.38
37 S. REP. No. 673, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 32 (1941) (citations omitted):
[T]he amended sections will produce uniformity in the treatment of amounts paid
in the nature of or in lieu of alimony regardless of the variance in the laws of
different States concerning the existence and continuance of any obligation to pay
alimony. In this respect the amendments are designed to remove the uncertainty
as to the tax consequences of payments made to a divorced spouse out of the net
income of so-called irrevocable alimony trusts, arising from the recent Supreme
Court decisions in Helvering v. Fitch .... Helvering v. Fuller .... and Helvering v.
Leonard . . . , which decisions make the test of whether such income is taxable to
the husband the existence of a continuing legal obligation under State law.
The reasons given for changing the Douglas v. Willkuts approach are sound enough,
but the "continuing legal obligation" test suffered from defects more fundamental than its
unsatisfactory side effects. The Supreme Court's decisions simply made no tax sense:
[Tihe policy judgment made by the Court [in Fuller, Fitch, and Leonard] is of
doubtful wisdom. It forces tax conscious prospective divorc6s to search for States
where the finality of settlements is assured. Moreover, it draws artifical distinctions
having no regard to tax criteria. In each situation the factor of prime importance is that
the obligation of support placed upon the husband is being fulfilled. The variety of methods
by which that obligation may be satisfied should be no concern of the income tax. Either the
satisfaction of that obligation suffices to warrant taxation of the husband, or it
does not. No appreciable advantage is derived from making tax classifications of
divorced husbands along the lines chosen by the Court. It is a bit ironical that the
husband who obtains the greatest advantage from the alimony trust, that of final
satisfaction of his obligation, is the one that is relieved of the tax.
Surrey, supra note 25, at 809 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
38 Section 117(a)-(b) of the Senate version of the proposed Revenue Act of 1941 (Sen-
ate Comm. on Finance Amendments to H.R. 5417, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 87 CONG. REC.
7266-67 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Committee Amendments]) would have taxed direct
alimony payments (not including payments attributable to transfers in trust) to the wife, and
would have given the husband a deduction. See S. REP. No. 673, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1,
at 32 (1941). Section 117(c) would have enacted a new § 171 of the 1939 Code, to read, in
pertinent part:
There shall be included in the gross income of an individual who is divorced
or legally separated under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance the
amount of the income of any trust such individual is entitled to receive which,
except for the provisions of this section, would be includible in the gross income
of such individual's spouse or former spouse, and such amount shall not, despite
section 166, section 167, or any other provision of this chapter, be includible in
the gross income of such spouse or former spouse.
Committee Amendments, supra, 87 CONG., REC. 7267 (1941). Since the direct alimony rules
(Committee Amendments, § 117(a)-(b), 87 CONG. REC. 7266-67 (1941) (proposing addition
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Congress modeled the 1942 legislation after the 1941 bill, but
made one significant change. Unlike the 1941 bill, the 1942 act
specifically applied section 71 to payments from alimony trusts.
Although the committee reports do not say why Congress chose to
govern alimony trusts by section 71, rather than by section 682, it
must have considered alimony trust payments so similar to non-
trust alimony payments as to merit taxation to the wife in much the
same way.3 9
D. Current Law
The history of the alimony trust legislation of 1942 does not
support the Ellis court's distinction between distributions of corpus
(which it apparently conceded to be taxable to the wife) and dis-
tributions of tax-exempt income. In the first place, the court mis-
construed the message of the committee reports. By focusing on
the committee's reference to corpus distributions, it treated as ex-
clusive what was merely one of a number of examples illustrating
a sweeping rule that all payments described in section 71 are fully
taxable; nothing in the report suggests that the committee intended
to establish a special rule limited to corpus distributions. 40 Fur-
thermore, Ellis and Stewart, by exempting some payments by
alimony trusts from taxation, create a distinction between trust and
nontrust alimony. Such a distinction sabotages Congress's deci-
sion to apply section 71 to alimony trusts, a decision surely delib-
erate, since the 1942 legislation differed from the 1941 Senate
proposals principally in this respect. The only conceivable reason
of §§ 22(k) and 23(a) to Int. Rev. Code of 1939)) would not have applied to payments from
an alimony trust, this new trust provision would have applied, and would have made the
wife taxable, but only as a trust beneficiary.
" The tax consequences are not identical, however. See note 15 supra, for the differ-
ences from the wife's point of view, and note 47 infra, for the even wider possible di-
vergence in the husband's position.
40 The full amount of periodic payments received under the circumstances de-
scribed in section [71(a)] is required to be included in the gross income of the
recipient whether such amounts are derived, in whole or in part, from income
received or accrued by the source to which such payments are attributable. Thus,
it matters not that such payments are attributable to property in trust, to life in-
surance, endowment, or annuity contracts, or to any other interest in property, or
are paid directly or indirectly by the obligor husband from his income or capital.
S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1942). The Report goes on to observe that such
specific "full inclusion" provisions as §§ 72(k) and 101(e) were designed to clarify the full-
inclusion rule as applied to life insurance and annuities, not to create special rules for
annuities or life insurance. Id. The Report also explains the limited function of § 682(b).
See note 15 supra. It is unfortunate that Congress was careful enough to clarify the law via
§§ 72(k) and 101(e), but left § 682(b) so nebulous.
1978] 1031
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:1022
for Congress's application of section 71 to alimony trusts is its con-
viction that wives receiving trust alimony should be taxed in the
same way as wives receiving direct alimony, a determination that
the Ellis court, although it echoed the bromide that "[t]axes should
be imposed by Congress, and not by the courts,' ignored.
Two Tax Court cases recognize the very limited function of
section 682(b). Welsh Trust v. Commissioner42 held that alimony paid
out of the corpus of a trust was taxable in full to the recipient,
reasoning that "whether the payments are made from income or
capital is not significant,"43 and quoting the legislative history of
section 71 in support. Similarly, in Twinam v. Commissioner,44 the Tax
Court held section 71 applicable to payments from an estate, ob-
serving that section 682(b) only determines the year in which pay-
ments are included in the recipient's income.45
Requiring full inclusion of trust alimony46 in the recipient's
41 416 F.2d at 897.
42 16 T.C. 1398 (1951), aff'd sub nom. Girard Trust Corn Exch. v. Commissioner, 194 F.2d
708 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 821 (1952). The case involved alimony paid to a non-
resident alien pursuant to a court order making the payments a charge against the corpus
of a trust. Persons in control of payments of "fixed or determinable annual or periodical
• . . income .. " of non-resident aliens must withhold a tax equal to 30% of such pay-
ments. I.R.C. § 1441(a). The court required that 30% of the total amount of the payments
be withheld. 16 T.C. at 1402.
43 16 T.C. at 1401.
44 22 T.C. 83 (1954), acq. 1954-2 C.B. 6.45 Id. at 90. The Service apparently failed to argue for "full inclusion" in Daniel v.
Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 1912 (1964), which allowed a beneficiary of an alimony
trust a share of depreciation of trust assets under § 167(h) (under the trust tax-accounting
rules, depreciation deducted not by the trust itself, but by the beneficiaries). The "full
inclusion" rule of § 71 should preclude such a deduction. See Dixon v. Commissioner, 44
T.C. 709 (1965). Section 71 does not, by its terms, compel denial of depreciation, since it
only requires inclusion of the amount of payments in the wife's "gross income." Giving the
wife a depreciation deduction is technically consistent with requiring inclusion of the full
payment in gross income. However, this would differ so radically from the treatment of
direct alimony, and would so resemble the prohibited practice of allowing a return of
capital to offset gross income where payments issue from corpus or an annuity contract (see
note 40 and accompanying text supra) that it should be prohibited. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-
3(a), T.D. 7285, 1973-2 C.B. 163, 164 (certain costs for which § 162(c), (f), or (g) would
deny a business expense deduction cannot offset gross receipts in computing gross in-
come).
The Ellis and Stewart decisions are criticized in Peschel, supra note 3, at 239-42, and 23
VAND. L. REv. 466 (1970).
46 A word about "alimony" payments "attributable to property" transferred outright,
rather than in trust, is appropriate. Suppose a divorce decree requires a husband to trans-
fer income-producing property to the wife. Does the "property transferred" portion of
§ 71 make the income from the property taxable to the wife as alimony? Normally, the
income from the property will be taxable to her anyway, but if the transferred property
consists of tax-exempt bonds, an attempt by the Service to require alimony treatment
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income comports with common sense and with congressional in-
tent. At the same time, this requirement seriously limits the flexibil-
ity of the alimony trust as a divorce planning device. Since alimony
trust payments in excess of trust income provide no tax benefit to
the trust or its creator but are fully taxable to the recipient, any
trust payment not out of the trust's ordinary income will "create"
income, in the sense that inclusion of the payment in the wife's
income will not be matched by a deduction or exclusion for the
husband.47 For this reason, no well-planned alimony trust will
permit payments of corpus or tax-exempt income.48
A number of commentators have declared that taxing the wife
in full on distributions from an alimony trust while denying the
husband a deduction for payments out of corpus is "inequitable,"
since the husband can always deduct directly-paid alimony against
his income. 49 The force of this argument depends upon the in-
would cause a serious problem. Two commentators have said that § 71 might apply to
income from property transferred outright to the wife. See Peschel, supra note 3, at 227-28;
Gerhart, Substantial support exists for amortizing life income interest in an alimony trust, 44 J.
TAXATION 167, 168 (1976). It is reasonably clear, however, that Congress meant the § 71
reference to transferred property to apply not to property transferred outright to the wife,
but only to transfers to third persons for the benefit of the wife (for example, to purchase
an annuity contract making payments to the wife) and to transfers of income interests in
property, since all of the "transferred property" examples in the committee reports involve
these kinds of transfers. See S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1942) (payments
attributable to "property in trust, to life insurance, endowment, or annuity contracts, or to
any other interest in property"). "Any other interest" is probably just expansive draftsman-
ship, but if it really includes absolute ownership, then the wife's tax-exempt bond interest
would be included in her income.
47 Section 71(d) provides that payments attributable to transferred property and taxa-
ble to the wife under § 71(a) are not included in the husband's gross income. But an
"exclusion" from income of an amount not includible in income in any event (such as a
distribution of corpus or tax-exempt interest) is worthless. And the husband gets no deduc-
tion for payments attributable to transferred property. Section 215(a) of the Code provides
that the husband cannot deduct any payment "not includible" in his gross income by rea-
son of § 71(d) or § 682; Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(c)(2) (1957) provides that "no part" of a pay-
ment under an annuity contract purchased by a husband to meet an alimony obligation is
deductible by him, and Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(c)(3) (1957) applies the "same rule" (as that
of § 1.71-1(c)(2)) to alimony trusts. This rule can be viewed as an application of Treas. Reg.
§ 1.215-1(a) (1957), which allows the husband to deduct under § 215 any alimony he has
"actually paid."
4' Since no competent lawyer would create an alimony trust funded with tax-exempt
bonds or permitted to distribute corpus or capital gains, problems in this area are most
likely to arise in cases involving transfers of interests in existing trusts, where the transfer
may seem such a handy way of satisfying the husband's obligation that it is done without
careful planning.
49 E.g., Hobbet, Avoiding the creation-of-income trap on a return of capital in alimony situa-
tions, 35 J. TAXATION 384 (1971); Peschel, supra note 3, at 246-47. Peschel argues that the
present tax structure is inequitable, and that "the trend of the alimony tax law has been
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terest the husband retains in the trust. The "simple" solution of
allowing the husband a deduction for trust payments not out of
income would be satisfactory only when the husband has retained a
reversionary interest in the trust. In the common case in which a
remainder is given to children or to a charity, a corpus distribution
to the wife reduces the wealth of the remainderman, not the hus-
band. The husband should hardly be allowed a deduction for a
payment that does not make him poorer. A legislative solution to
the "creation of income" problem could take these variations into
account; in the meantime the regulations provide a rational if
somewhat crude solution to a difficult problem. If contested, these
regulations should be upheld. The trust draftsman can easily avoid
the "creation of income" problem by providing for direct payment
by the husband in the event that the trust has insufficient income,
using the trust corpus only as security.50
II
CHOOSING THE PERSON TAXABLE ON THE
INCOME OF A "NON-SECTION 71" ALIMONY TRUST
Most of the pre-1942 litigation over alimony trusts involved
choosing the person taxable on the trust's income. Facilitating this
identification was a major goal of the 1942 legislation. Although it
answered most questions concerning alimony trusts, this legislation
left a gap. Sections 71 and 682 clearly resolve cases of (1) trusts
making payments that fit section 71's definition of alimony ("sec-
tion 71 alimony trusts"), and (2) trusts in which the wife received
against the wife." Id. at 250. This view fails to give proper weight to the benefits that may
accrue to either spouse, or both, from the income-splitting allowed by the alimony pro-
visions. The husband may well be willing to make larger deductible (or excludible) pay-
ments than he would (or could) make if the payments were not deductible. The real bur-
den of alimony taxation is borne by the spouse with the lesser bargaining power. A more
substantial objection to the "creation of income" possibility is that it discourages some very
useful arrangements. For example, "creation of income" would discourage the formation
of an alimony trust with a power to invade corpus to meet the wife's extraordinary ex-
penses. But whether discouraging these trusts burdens the husband or the wife depends
solely upon what alternative arrangement the parties adopt.
50 I do not wish energetically to defend a rule that operates as a tax on poor tax
planning, but the creation-of-income "trap" does serve one useful function. When a hus-
band transfers appreciated property to an alimony trust, whether the appreciation is
thereby realized by the husband becomes a troublesome problem. It is amenable to solution
if the wife has only an income interest, but if she has more-for example, an income
interest plus a power to invade corpus-it is almost insoluble. See notes 103-04 and accom-
panying text infra. The creation-of-income phenomenon discourages the creation of such
trusts.
1034
1978] ALIMONY TRUSTS 1035
an interest before divorce was contemplated ("preexisting trusts").
In both cases the wife is taxed. Payments she receives from a "sec-
tion 71 alimony trust" are income in full, even if out of corpus or
tax-exempt income, as explained above. Payments from a "preex-
isting trust" are taxed to her "as a beneficiary" under section
682(a).51 Not clearly covered by these rules are "non-section 71"
alimony trusts-trusts that are neither "preexisting trusts" (because
they were created or transferred as part of a divorce settlement),
nor "section 71 alimony trusts" (because the trust payments do not
conform to the terms of section 71-for example, trust payments
that are not "periodic"). 52 There are three possible approaches to
taxing the income of these "non-section 71" alimony trusts: (1) tax-
ation to the wife, the result suggested by a literal reading of section
682(a); (2) taxation according to the rule of Douglas v. Willcuts
(to the husband if the payments discharge his "continuing obliga-
tion," otherwise to the wife), the Service's position; or (3) taxation
to the husband under section 677, a position suggested by one Tax
Court opinion. For convenience of presentation, this Article will
first consider trusts in which the wife has only an income interest.
51 Because § 71 and § 682(a) operate very differently upon the wife, the problem of
distinguishing § 71 trusts from § 682 trusts assumes importance. The regulations (§ 1.682(a)-
l(a)(2) (1957)), reflecting the legislative history, provide that § 682(a) applies to a trust
"created before the divorce or separation and not in contemplation of it," and that "section
71 applies only if the creation of the trust or payments by a previously created trust are in
discharge of [the husband's support obligation]." An example from the regulations under
§ 71 provides that the mere mention in a divorce decree of a pre-existing trust making
payments to a former spouse suffices to make § 71, rather than § 682, apply to the trust,
even if the decree alters none of its terms. (§ 1.71-1(b)(6) (ex.2) (1957)). This arbitrary
provision serves no useful purpose. Unless the divorce decree or settlement agreement
makes a significant change in a previously established trust (for example, by terminating
the husband's power to prevent distributions of income or corpus to the wife), the trust
performs no alimony function and its payments should not be taxed as alimony under
§ 71. This regulation would bestow upon the words of the divorce decree an almost magical
power-an offhand reference to an irrevocable trust created long before the divorce could
change that trust into an alimony trust. Section 71 applies to payments from property
"transferred" in discharge of the husband's obligation; a statement in a decree acknowledg-
ing that a transfer took place in the distant past should not be treated as a present "trans-
fer" of anything.
52 In order for § 71 to apply to payments by a trust, those payments must meet all the
requirements for direct alimony; they must be "periodic,' they must not have been desig-
nated as child support, they must be "for support" (see generally Harris, The Federal Income
Tax Treatment of Alimony Payments-The "Support" Requirement of the Regulations, 22 HASTINGS
L.J. 53 (1970)), and they must bear the appropriate relation to a decree or written instru-
ment, and to the status of divorce, legal separation, or separation under a writton separa-
tion agreement. See generally J. Taggart, SOME TAX ASPECTS Or SEPARATION AND DIVORCE
(2d ed. 1975); H. GUTMAN & F. SANDER, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION, Tax Mngm't Portfolio
(BNA) 95-3d (1975).
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The taxpayer in Daniel v. Commissioner53 argued that the wife
should be taxed on the income of all "non-section 71" alimony
trusts. The trust in Daniel did not satisfy section 71 because the
payments to the wife were not periodic; the taxpayer argued that
section 682(a) required taxing the trust income to the wife. A literal
reading of section 682(a) does support that result, because that
section requires that a divorced or separated spouse include in her
income "the amount of the income of any trust which such wife is
entitled to receive and which, except for this section, would be
includible in the gross income of her husband." The Tax Court
rejected this reading in Daniel, relying primarily upon the Senate
Report on section 682. This Report noted that section 682(a) "states
the rule applicable . . . in the case of trusts created prior to the
divorce or separation and to which the provisions of [section 71]
are not applicable. '54 The court concluded that this history barred
the taxpayer's use of section 682(a), saying: "[W]e feel section 71 is
applicable, rendering section 682(a) inapplicable. ' 55 In fact, section
71 was not "applicable" to the Daniel trust, in the sense of making
trust payments taxable to the wife, because the payments were not
periodic. The court's language may have been infelicitous, but its
meaning was plain: A trust created or transferred as part of a
divorce settlement is beyond the scope of section 682(a). There-
fore, section 682(a) cannot be used as a substitute for section 71 to
tax the income of all such trusts to the wife. The Tax Court did not
decide how, with section 682(a) inapplicable, the income of "non-
section 71" alimony trusts would be taxed, since it determined that
the husband had not actually transferred any interest in the trust to
his wife. 56 The payments she had received were, therefore, direct
payments from her husband, neither taxable to her nor deductible
by him because they were not "periodic" and thus not "alimony."
The congressional decision to treat direct and trust alimony
equivalently supports the Daniel holding that section 682(a) can-
not apply to a trust created or transferred as part of a divorce set-
tlement. 57 Had the Daniel taxpayer's position been accepted, a tax-
53 56 T.C. 655 (1971), aff'd mem., 461 F.2d 1265 (5th Cir. 1972).
541Id. at 660 (quoting S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1942)).
55Id. at 661.
56 Id. at 659.
51 The legislative history is not entirely clear. The regulations under § 682 provide that
§ 682(a) applies "for example" to preexisting trusts. Treas. Reg. § 1.682(a)-1(a)(2) (1957).
The committee reports display a bit more conviction; they say that § 682 "states the rule
applicable to" these trusts, not merely that these trusts are examples of trusts subject to
that section. But the reports go on to say that § 682 applies to "any" trust making pay-
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payer could use section 682(a) to achieve alimony treatment for
payments that fail to meet section 71's requirements for alimony
payments. 58 If these restrictive standards served an important pur-
pose, this argument would be compelling. As it is, section 71's
alimony definition, particularly the requirement that payments be
"periodic," seems an arbitrary rule, probably enacted more because
periodicity is a common feature of what Congress had in mind
when it thought of alimony than because there is some good reason
for restricting section 71 to payments that are "periodic."59 None-
theless, Congress has imposed these requirements for alimony
treatment. Congress's decision to treat trust and nontrust alimony
similarly supports Daniel's conclusion that section 682(a) cannot
apply to divorce-settlement transfers in trust.
If section 682(a) does not require taxing the wife on the income
of a "non-section 71" alimony trust, how should such income be
taxed? In Revenue Ruling 74-9460 the Service answered this ques-
tion by reviving the Douglas v. Willcuts distinction between a trust
whose creation discharges the husband's support obligation and a
trust whose payments satisfy a continuing obligation.61 If the hus-
ments to a wife, if those payments would, but for § 682, be included in the husband's
income. S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1942).
38 The Tax Court said in Daniel that, were it to accept the taxpayer's view of § 682(a),
it "would in effect be reading out the parenthetical clause ... set forth in section 71(a)(1)."
56 T.C. at 661. If the Daniel taxpayer's argument had been accepted, taxpayers would be
able to agree to transfer to the wife a fixed amount of money over a relatively short peri-
od, by putting property in trust to pay income to her until the fixed amount was reached.
If applicable, § 682(a) would give this arrangement a tax effect much the same as if the
husband had made the payments directly and deducted them. But § 215 would permit no
deduction for direct payments made under such an agreement.
59 For a criticism of some early writers who insisted that regularity of receipt was an
essential attribute of income, see H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 65-83 (1938).
"0 1974-1 C.B. 26. This ruling concerns a trust making payments to a wife for purposes
other than "support" (her income from other sources was sufficient to support her). The
ruling holds that because the payments were not "for support," the trust was not a § 71 trust.
Since the principal purpose of the § 71 "support" requirement is to deny alimony treatment
to payments taking the form of alimony, but in fact made to purchase a property interest
from the wife (see Harris, supra note 52, at 58-59), this application of the "support" require-
ment seems unduly restrictive. Although payments for luxuries may hot amount to "sup-
port" payments in some contexts (for example, the dependency exemption of §§ 151 and
152), no good reason exists to restrict § 71 to payments for necessities. Another reason given
in the ruling for not applying § 71 is that distributions to the wife were discretionary with the
trustees. 1974-1 C.B., at 27. The significance of this is not explained; perhaps the Service
feels that discretionary distributions are not "periodic."
61 The ruling cites Helvering v. Fuller and Helvering v. Fitch, but not Pearce v. Commis-
sioner, 315 U.S. 543 (1942) (see note 35 supra). 1974-1 C.B. at 28. This omission renders the
ruling an incorrect application of pre-§ 71 law, even on the dubious assumption that this law
should continue to apply until expressly overruled by Congress.
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band creates the trust as part of a settlement that protects him
from any additional liability, the wife is taxed on the trust's income,
but if the husband remains even contingently liable to support the
wife, the trust's income is taxed to him. This distinction was un-
satisfactory when it was created; to revive it today, after Congress
has rejected the reasoning of its parent cases, is inexcusable. 62
Furthermore, at least in states that allow the husband to terminate
his support duty, Revenue Ruling 74-94 is open to the same criti-
cism as the taxpayer's argument in Daniel, for it allows some tax-
payers to achieve a section 71 result without satisfying section 71's
conditions.
Instead of taxing the income of all "non-section 71" trusts to
the wife (under the Daniel taxpayer's argument) or taxing the in-
come of some of these trusts to the wife and that of others to the
husband (under Revenue Ruling 74-94), the income of all "non-
section 71" trusts created in connection with divorce might simply
be taxed to the husband under section 677.63 This solution would
harmonize the trust rules both with the rules for nontrust pay-
ments and with the reasoning of the Daniel opinion.64 Taxing the
husband on the income of all "non-section 71" alimony trusts
would conflict with some decisions involving the creation of trusts
to satisfy obligations other than alimony. 65 But even if those cases
12 In Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908), Justice Holmes noted:
The major premise of the conclusion expressed in a statute, the change of policy
that induces the enactment, may not be set out in terms, but it is not an adequate
discharge of duty for courts to say: We see what you are driving at, but you have
not said it, and therefore we shall go on as before.
63 Under § 677, income actually distributed to support someone whom the trust grantor
is "legally obligated to support or maintain" is taxable to the grantor; this rule is the basis for
taxing the husband under Revenue Ruling 74-94 if the divorce proceedings fail to terminate
his support obligation. See 1974-1 C.B., at 27-28. If the proceedings do terminate his obliga-
tion, the local law obligation to support can no longer justify the application of § 677, but the
obligation the husband assumed by establishing the trust could serve exactly the same pur-
pose. Cf. Taylor v. Campbell, 335 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1964) (payments pursuant to support
agreement deductible as alimony, even though local law would have imposed no support
obligation in absence of agreement).
64 See notes 55-56 and accompanying text supra. Daniel did not actually reach the issue of
how to tax the income of "non-section 71" trusts, since the Tax Court found that the state
court proceedings had not actually transferred to the wife any interest in the trust, but had
merely awarded her a right to alimony payments, secured by a lien on the husband's interest
in the trust. 56 T.C. at 659. The essentially formal distinction between an interest "trans-
ferred to" a wife and a "lien" to secure a right against the husband himself is another good
reason for refusing, wherever possible, to distinguish trust from direct alimony.
65 In Helvering v. Blumenthal, 296 U.S. 552 (1935) (per curiam), the Supreme Court,
on the authority of Douglas v. Willcuts, reversed a court of appeals decision that a taxpayer
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are right (or well-entrenched), divorce-related trusts are unique. 66
Congress has determined that since they serve the same purpose as
nontrust alimony they should receive the same tax treatment. This
determination justifies resolving close cases by choosing the ap-
propriate "nontrust" result, whenever possible.
It is appropriate to tax the husband on the income of "non-
section 71" alimony trusts in which the wife receives only an in-
come interest. However, creation of a trust giving her a greater
interest, such as income for her life and a testamentary power of
appointment over trust corpus, might be treated as an outright
transfer of the property to the wife. Such a transfer differs in no
was not taxable on the income of a trust used to pay her debts, where the taxpayer remained
personally liable. The court of appeals had held that the taxpayer was merely a surety after
the transfer of the property to the trust, so that she should not be taxed on trust income
used to pay the debt. Blumenthal v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 507, 508 (2d Cir. 1935). Accord,
Mosby v. United States, 50-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9120 (W.D. Tenn. 1949) (taxpayer
establishing trust providing sister with regular income in exchange for her cancellation of
debt held taxable on trust income because he had guaranteed trust income of at least $5,000
per year, thus making his obligation "continuing"). Because taxing the trust's income to the
taxpayer is inconsistent with requiring the taxpayer to recognize gain on the transfer, these
cases also support the Service's theory that a transfer of an income interest is not taxable
unless it relieves the taxpayer of the obligation prompting the transfer. See notes 84-86 and
accompanying text infra.
An analogous problem concerns the recognition of gain on donative transfers of
mortgaged property. The law applicable to such transactions remains unsettled. See generally
Bacas, Gifts of Property Subject to Indebtedness: Johnson v. Commissioner, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
86 (1975); Note, Income Tax Consequences of Encumbered Gifts: The Advent of Crane, 28 U. FLA.
L. REV. 935 (1976). It is, however, reasonably clear that these transfers can be taxable despite
the transferor's continued personal liability. See First Nat'l Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 404
F.2d 1182 (6th Cir. 1968) (transfer of encumbered stock to charity, with mere "understand-
ing" that charity would pay transferor's personal debt with stock or proceeds of its sale
resulted in gain to transferor), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1014 (1969); Malone v. United States,
326 F. Supp. 106 (N.D. Miss. 1971) (trustees assumed mortgage, but taxpayer remained sec-
ondarily liable, gain recognized), affd per curiam, 455 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1972); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1011-2(a)(3) (1972) (amount of indebtedness to which property subject treated as amount
realized, for purposes of § 1011 (b), "even though the transferee does not agree to assume or
pay the indebtedness"); Rev. Rul. 70-626, 1970-2 C.B. 158 (transfer of encumbered stock to
charity, taxpayer remained personally liable but charity agreed to pay debt, resulted in gain
to transferor).
66 In Fox v. United States, 510 F.2d 1330 (3d Cir. 1975), the court held § 483 inappli-
cable to installment payments to a former spouse. The Fox taxpayer argued that under §
483 part of each payment was deductible as imputed interest. The court rejected this ar-
gument primarily because Congress had, in § 71, spelled out the circumstances un-
der which a spouse was taxable on divorce payments without providing for imputed inter-
est. Since the nonperiodic payments in question were not taxable to the wife under § 71,
they were not deductible, in whole or in part, by the husband. If installment payments are
made in exchange for property, however, § 483 does apply. Gerlach v. United States, 74-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9425 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
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significant way from an outright transfer of the property, followed
by her establishing the trust.67 No income tax cases have had to
deal with such trusts. They are probably very uncommon, 68 since
this kind of transfer is little better for the husband, 69 and consider-
ably worse for the wife, than a simple transfer of property.
III
WHEN IS THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY TO AN
ALIMONY TRUST A TAXABLE EVENT?
In United States v. Davis,7 0 the Supreme Court held that a hus-
band's transfer of appreciated stock to his wife in exchange for her
release of marital rights was a taxable disposition of the stock. The
Court held the husband taxable on the appreciation, just as if he
had sold the stock for cash and transferred the proceeds to his
wife.7" Applying Davis to some alimony trusts presents no real
problem.7 2 Suppose that the wife receives all trust income for life
and a testamentary power of appointment over the trust corpus.
She becomes the only person with a beneficial interest in the trust.
The husband has completely disposed of his property in a taxable
transfer and is clearly taxable under Davis. But when the husband
transfers only an income interest in the property to his wife, and
either retains a reversion in the trust corpus or transfers a remain-
67 Cf. Rev. Rul. 62-106, 1962-2 C.B. 21 (husband who pays wife's medical and dental
expenses directly can deduct payments under § 215, in same way he could deduct alimony
payments; wife can treat payments as medical expenses paid by her, for purposes of §
213). But cf. Jernigan v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 615 (1975) (implying that wife
gets no deduction for fees paid her lawyer by her husband, even though fee would have
been deductible under § 212 if she had paid it herself).
68 They are not unheard of. See the trust described in Estate of Hundley v. Commis-
sioner, 52 T.C. 495 (1969), affd per curiam, 435 F.2d 1311 (4th Cir. 1971), a gift tax case.
69 If local law does not permit the husband to discharge his support obligation com-
pletely, he might prefer to establish this kind of trust rather than make a direct transfer to
the wife, since the trust arrangement eliminates the danger that the wife may dissipate the
property and then sue him for support. The danger may be remote, but people getting
divorced sometimes have low opinions of their spouses.
70 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
71 For analyses of the Davis rule, see Barton, Tax Aspects of Divorce and Property Settle-
ment Agreements-The Davis, Gilmore and Patrick Cases, 1964 S. CAL. TAX INST. 421; Gunn,
The Federal Income Tax Effects of the Missouri Version of the Uniform Divorce Act, 1974 WASH.
U. L.Q. 227, 230-41; Schwartz, Divorce and Taxes: New Aspects of the Davis Denouement, 15
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 176 (1967).
72 The application of the Davis rule to the creation of alimony trusts is discussed in
O'Byrne, Escape from Holy Deadlock: Some Current Problems of Divorce, 45 TAXES 63, 66-71
(1967); Comment, Tax Aspects of Alimony Trusts, 66 YALE L.J. 881, 882-85 (1957).
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der in it to his children or a charity, it is not clear whether Davis
applies, or how to measure gain or loss if it does.
Three revenue rulings directly address the question of gain to
the husband on a transfer of appreciated property to an income-
interest alimony trust. As the only authoritative sources to discuss
this troublesome problem, these rulings merit more detailed anal-
ysis than is normally appropriate for revenue rulings.
Both Revenue Ruling 57-506 7 and Revenue Ruling 57-5077
4
concerned husbands who. established alimony trusts under which
their wives received income interests and the remainder interests
went to charity.7 5 Each trust agreement required the husband to
make additional payments to the wife if the trust income fell below
a designated amount.7 6 The agreement in Revenue Ruling 57-507
terminated the husband's obligation to make up deficiencies in
trust income if and when he transferred to the trust additional
securities to raise the value of the trust corpus to a specified level.
Revenue Ruling 57-507 held the husband taxable upon the trans-
fer of appreciated stock to the trust, to the extent that the apprecia-
tion was attributable to the wife's income interest. Thus, if the
value of the wife's income interest equalled half the value of the
property, the husband realized half the appreciation.77 In contrast,
Revenue Ruling 57-506 held that the husband's transfer of prop-
erty to the trust was not a taxable event, "since no economic benefit
inures to him from such transfer. 7 8
In Revenue Ruling 59-47, 79 issued to explain the distinction
between the 1957 rulings, the Service focused on the "important
factual difference" that the husband whose transfer was taxable
could have satisfied his support obligation in full by transferring
73 1957-2 C.B. 65.
74 1957-2 C.B. 511.
"' The trust in Revenue Ruling 57-506 limited the wife's income interest to a stated
quarterly figure; the wife in Revenue Ruling 57-507 could invade corpus if income after
her husband's death fell below a specified figure. These special features apparently af-
fected only the value of the wife's interest.
Under current law, few taxpayers are likely to establish alimony trusts with remainders
to charity, since trusts satisfying the post-1969 requirements for the charitable deduction
(§ 170(f)) are unlikely to be good alimony trusts. Both the "annuity trust" and the "uni-
trust" involve a risk of income creation if payments to the wife are taxed under § 71, and a
provision for terminating payments upon the wife's remarriage would apparently disqual-
ify a trust under § 664(d)(1)(A), (2)(A).
76 Rev. Rul. 57-506, 1957-2 G.B. at 66; Rev. Rul. 57-507, 1957-2 G.B. at 511.
77 Rev. Rul. 57-507, 1957-2 C.B. at 512-13.
78 Rev. Rul. 57-506, 1957-2 C.B. at 66.
79 1959-1 C.B. 198.
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sufficient property to the trust, whereas the other husband would
always remain liable to make up deficiencies in trust income. This
distinction strongly resembles that developed before 1942 under
Douglas v. Willcuts, although the rulings do not cite that case.
Neither the method described in Revenue Ruling 57-507 for
computing the husband's gain nor the distinction drawn by the
Service between taxable and nontaxable transfers is sound. In
computing the taxpayer's gain, Revenue Ruling 57-507 errs in al-
locating part of the taxpayer's basis in the property to the income
interest. A taxpayer who receives rental income from leasing un-
improved land or dividend income from stock cannot offset any of
his basis in the property against his receipts in measuring his in-
come. This rule is in part simply a matter of convention, since it
would not be absurd to allow some of the basis of nondepreciable
property to reduce income other than sale income. s0 However, the
current rule is both sensible and well-established."' Therefore, a
80 See Joyce & Del Cotto, The AB (ABC) and BA Transactions: An Economic and Tax
Analysis of Reserved and Carved Out Income Interests, 31 TAX L. REV. 121 (1976); Surrey, supra
note 25, at 788-91.
81 Joyce and Del Cotto contend that the owner of nondepreciable income-producing
property (a bond, for example) should be allowed to offset part of his basis in the property
against each receipt of interest, because part of the purchase price of the property was
paid for the right to receive that income payment. Joyce & Del Cotto, supra note 80, at
182-89. They argue that part of the income a taxpayer "realizes" under current law, each
time an interest payment is made, is attributable not to the value of the payment itself, but
to a presumed increase in the value of the income-producing property other than the right
to receive the particular payment. Id. at 124-26. They argue that this represents "un-
realized appreciation," upon which the taxpayer should not be taxed. It is true that part of
the gain realized on the receipt of every interest payment can be thought of as attributable
to the passage of time, making the other interest payments and the return of the principal
not so far off as they used to be. It does not follow, however, that this "unrealized appreci-
ation" should not be taxed. Two reasons are usually given for not taxing unrealized ap-
preciation: the difficulty and expense of periodic valuation of unsold property, and the
taxpayer's lack of cash with which to pay the tax. Neither applies where the taxpayer is
receiving cash interest payments. Indeed, since the appreciation in question is always ac-
companied by the receipt of cash, it seems somewhat unsatisfactory even to call it "un-
realized" appreciation. Nor does the possibility that the underlying property (i.e. a bond, or
stock, or land) may be decreasing in value while the taxpayer is paying a tax based on the
assumption that its value is constant mean that the present treatment of income from
non-depreciable property is incorrect. The decrease in the property's value will be reflected
when it is disposed of. Any method of allowing a return of capital that allows a full return
produces the correct income figure in the long run. As a result, the choice between one
method and another becomes largely a matter of convenience, and of preventing undue
deferrals of tax. The present system of taxing income from non-wasting assets is simple,
accords with popular understanding of when income is realized, matches the realization of
income with the receipt of cash, and tends to attribute income to the taxpayer as he be-
comes wealthier. In any event, as Joyce and Del Cotto concede, the present treatment of
income from non-wasting assets is "embedded in the tax law." Id. at 186.
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taxpayer who sells his right to the income from property should
not be (and usually has not been) allowed to use part of the proper-
ty's basis to reduce income from the sale.82 If the taxpayer sells an
82 To be consistent, sales of income interests should receive the same tax treatment as
receipt of the income. Absence of consistency would provide taxpayers with a strong incen-
tive to sell their income interests in order to defer taxation.
Where the income interest transferred is of short duration, taxpayers have apparently
not even argued that part of their basis should reduce receipts in determining gain. See,
e.g., Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transport, Inc., 364 U.S. 130 (1960) (taxpayer argued
unsuccessfully for capital gains treatment for compensation for use of taxpayer's business
facilities for about ten months); Estate of Stranahan v. Commissioner, 472 F.2d 867 (6th
Cir. 1973) (Commissioner argued for loan treatment for sale of right to future dividends);
Rhodes' Estate v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1942) (per curiam) (taxpayer argued
unsuccessfully for capital gains treatment for sale of right to dividend declared prior to
sale). When longer periods were involved, taxpayers have argued that sales receipts should
be reduced by their bases in the property, but have failed to persuade the courts. See, e.g.,
Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941) (no part of consideration paid lessor for cancel-
ling a lease with about eleven years to go treated as a return of capital).
The rule requiring full inclusion of rent in income, without an offset for basis (except
for depreciation), is also in point. A lease, like the "sale" of an income interest, is nothing
more than a temporary transfer of the right to use property. The appeal of a rule allocat-
ing no basis to a transferred income interest decreases as the duration of that interest
increases. An assignment of an income interest for a very long time might well be treated
as a sale of the property, with a full basis offset, on the ground that the reversion should
be ignored because its present value is trivial. Cf. Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 49, 42-43
("rental" for period approximating useful life of property, with rent in early years approx-
imately equal to price for which property could be bought, constitutes a sale). Accord, Rev.
Rul. 60-122, 1960-1 C.B. 56.
Some cases have allowed a basis offset for sales of life estates. In Estate of Camden v.
Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 926 (1942), aff d mem., 139 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1943), the Board
of Tax Appeals refused "lease" treatment on the the technical ground that a life estate was
"property," and somehow essentially different from a term of years, but suggested that the
result would differ where the life estate consisted "only of the right to receive income." Id.
at 931. Accord, King v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 108 (1958).
The same basis-allocation problem arises in connection with sales of property in which
the seller retains a term interest such as a life estate; the common "sale and leaseback"
transaction is one such transaction. Allocating no basis to a life estate or term income
interest retained by the seller would permit the seller to offset his revenue from the inter-
est sold by the basis in the entire property. This in turn would require including the value
of the retained interest as part of the amount realized on the sale, to prevent the seller
from claiming an artificial loss. Some cases support this result. See, e.g., Steinway & Sons v.
Commissioner, 46 T.C. 375 (1966), acq. 1967-2 C.B. 3. But see Hunter v. Commissioner, 44
T.C. 109 (1965) (sale of property with reservation of life estate, basis apportioned between
retained and transferred interests according to Treas. Reg. § 1.61-6(a) (1957)); Rev. Rul.
77-413, 1977-45 I.R.B. 18. For a recent discussion of the sale and leaseback cases, see
Morris, Sale-Leaseback Transactions of Real Property-A Prbposal, 30 THE TAX LAWYER 701
(1977).
Because of concessions by the government, no court has had to decide the proper
measure of gain on a transfer to a divorce trust in which the wife receives only an income
interest. In Gardner Trust v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 885 (1953), acq. in part, 1953-2 C.B. 4,
the Commissioner stipulated that the trust's basis in transferred stock was the stock's value
at the time of the transfer unless the transfer was a gift; the possibility that the transfer
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income interest and disposes of the remainder, he has fully dis-
posed of his property and his basis must be taken into account; but
if he has given the remainder away all the property's basis should
be allocated to the remainder interest.83 Therefore, if the husband
in Revenue Ruling 57-507 should have been taxed, he should have
realized gain in the full amount of the value of the transferred
income interest, without any offset for basis. But the real problem
with the rulings is not the error in measuring gain; it is the conclu-
was a gift in part and a sale in part was not raised. Spruance v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 141
(1973), aff'd mem., 505 F.2d 731 (3d Cir. 1974), also required a determination of the basis
of trust property. The Commissioner argued, unsuccessfully, that the taxpayer was es-
topped from claiming any step-up in basis because no gain had been reported at the time
of the transfer. The court observed in a footnote that the trust should have only a carry-
over basis (under § 1015) in the corpus, a result consistent with the argument advanced
here, but said that, in view of the Commissioner's concession that Revenue Ruling 57-507
applied in determining the trust's basis, it would not "decide to petitioner's detriment that
there is no step-up in basis." Id. at 156 n.7. The Spruance court seemed willing to give the
wife an amortizable basis in her income interest, an approach that is "logical" but wrong.
See text accompanying notes 97-102 infra.
In King v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 108, 116 (1958), involving the transfer of a legal life
estate, the court also made a Revenue Ruling 57-507 basis allocation. Nothing in the opin-
ion suggests that the Service had argued for no basis offset, and its position in Revenue
Ruling 57-507 suggests that it did not. Nor did the taxpayer argue that the transfer was
not taxable for any of the reasons discussed below (see notes 84-102 and accompanying text
infra); instead he argued that he should not be taxed because the "amount realized" could
not be measured, a theory the Supreme Court rejected in Davis. Del Cotto, Sales and Other
Dispositions of Property Under Section 1001: The Taxable Event, Amount Realized and Related
Problems of Basis, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 219, 284-85 (1977), approves of Revenue Ruling
57-507 on the "benefit" theory and cites as authority King, Douglas v. Willeuts, and Helvering
v. Fuller.
83 Under Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-1(b), T.D. 7142, 1971-2 C.B. 295, 298, which may have
been drafted with only fully donative transfers in mind, the remainderman's share of the
property's "uniform basis" is increased with the passage of time to reflect the increase in
the value of the remainder interest. The uniform basis rules operate so that the remain-
derman will eventually receive the donor's basis in the property (with adjustments not rele-
vant here), just as if the donor had given him the property outright. The life tenant has a
share of the uniform basis, but unless the entire property is sold (see § 1001(e)(3)), he can
neither amortize it against the property's income nor deduct it from the proceeds of the
property's sale. (See §§ 1001(e), 273). In effect the remainderman receives all the donor's
basis, although he does not get it all until the life estate terminates. I see no good rea-
son for treating a donative remainderman differently because the income interest was
disposed of in a taxable transaction, rather than by gift. If the transferor can use some of
the basis in the property in computing gain on the transfer, allowing the remainderman
the usual section 1015 basis would mean that some of the basis would be used twice, once
by the transferor in computing gain and again by the remainderman when he gets the
property. Taxing the transferor on the full amount received for the income interest pre-
vents this "double benefit." Denying one who sells an income interest any use of his basis is
also consistent with the long-standing practice of taxing in full the income of property
retained, rather than' sold (see note 80 supra); accordingly the rule suggested in the text
produces the correct result whether one looks at the transaction from the point of view of
the transferor or of the remainderman.
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sion that either husband had effected a taxable disposition of his
property.
In drawing its distinction between taxable and nontaxable
transfers to alimony trusts, the Service has held that whether
the husband is taxable on the transfer of appreciated stock de-
pends upon whether state law can compel him to make addition-
al payments to his wife.84 In other words, the tax treatment of
the stock transfer depends upon whether the transferor may have
to transfer something else, some other time. Stated in this simple
(but accurate) way, the rule of Revenue Ruling 59-47 is preposter-
ous. Since each husband had disposed of an income interest in his
property, any respectable argument for taxing one would require
taxing both.
The rationale of Revenue Ruling 59-47 is that the taxed hus-
band could have terminated his support obligation by making
further transfers, so that the transfer in question was the first step
in a process by which he would "receive a benefit" in the form of
relief from his support obligation. Even if the rulings were correct
in making receipt of a benefit the test of whether a taxpayer must
realize appreciation in his property, they misapplied the test. Even
a husband who will always be legally responsible for support re-
ceives a benefit to the extent that income from the transferred
property meets part of his obligation. 85 As a practical matter, if the
husband funds the trust with secure income-producing property,
the obligation to make up deficits will be of little or no importance.
The fundamental error of Revenue Ruling 59-47, however, is not
that it misapplied a sensible test but that it applied a meaningless
"' In Kraut v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Wis. 1970), a taxpayer who had
made an outright transfer of appreciated property to his wife argued that Davis did not
apply because he remained liable for support under local law after the transfer. If the
approach of the rulings discussed in the text were sound, this argument should have suc-
ceeded. It did not. The only difference between Kraut and many transfers to alimony trusts
is one of visibility. When the transfer is outright, anyone can see that the taxpayer has
disposed of property and so should be taxed, if the disposition was taxable. In contrast,
transfers to trusts often involve facts so complex that they obscure the issues.
5 The essence of the Davis decision is simple: anyone who satisfies an obligation by
transferring appreciated property realizes that appreciation. 320 U.S. at 71-74. Nothing in
the Court's reasoning suggests that the result should differ if the transferor satisfies only
part of his obligation. If a taxpayer sold appreciated property and transferred the proceeds
to his wife as part of a divorce settlement, no one would doubt that he had realized the
appreciation, whether or not the payment fully discharged his obligation. There is no im-
portant difference between that case and a direct transfer of the property itself. Suppose a
debtor transfers appreciated property to a creditor in partial satisfaction of a claim uncer-
tain in amount, and agrees to pay the balance later: Is there any doubt that he has realized
a gain or loss on the transfer?
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test. Receipt of a benefit has no bearing on whether a taxable dis-
position has occurred.86 Recognition of gain or loss is triggered
by disposition of the property in question, not by "receipt of a
benefit."
The error of looking for the "receipt of a benefit" as a test of
taxability is an old and persistent one, deriving perhaps from Eisner
v. Macomber,87 which held a stock dividend constitutionally immune
from treatment as income because it did not make the taxpayer
richer. Very few taxable dispositions, in and of themselves, enrich
the taxpayer, 88 and many make him poorer. A taxpayer who owns
a house with a basis of $20,000 and a value of $50,000 has a gain,
not a loss (for tax purposes), when it blows away in a storm and the
taxpayer receives $40,000 in insurance proceeds.8 9 Conversely, a
taxpayer may benefit from appreciation of his property without
having to recognize gain, as when he leases the property or uses it
as security for a loan.90 Since the receipt of a benefit does not
trigger realization of gain if the property is not disposed of, and
since a taxable disposition does trigger realization even if no ben-
efit results from the disposition, the rulings applying Davis to
86 The amount of consideration received in a disposition may determine whether it
produces a gain or a loss: one who sells property with a basis of $10 for $20 has a gain,
while one who sells property with the same basis for $5 has a loss. But the rulings dis-
cussed here use "receipt of a benefit" as a test of whether a disposition has been made, not
simply whether it produces a gain or loss.
87 252 U.S. 189 (1920). For a recent criticism of the proposition that any dividend
enriches the recipient and a discussion of some recent errors resulting from a misun-
derstanding of this point, see Kingson, The Deep Structure of Taxation: Dividend Distributions,
85 YALE L.J. 861 (1976).
88 For example, when a taxpayer sells a house with a basis of $20,000 for $50,000, his
gain really comes not from the sale, but from holding the house. The sale merely ex-
changes a $50,000 house for $50,000 in cash.
89 See § 1001. Similarly, a taxpayer who disposes of property subject to a mortgage on
which he is not personally liable must include the unpaid mortgage in his amount realized,
even though the disposition cannot be said to have "benefited" him in any immediate
sense. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947). It is true, of course, that this taxpayer
has "received a benefit" in the long run. If the mortgage was not a purchase money
mortgage, he benefited when he received money upon mortgaging the property; if it was a
purchase money mortgage, he still benefited from being able to include the mortgage in
his basis and take depreciation deductions upon it. See id., at 3 & n.2. The point here is
that the disposition need not (and typically does not) by itself enrich the taxpayer. The
Service seems to feel (in the alimony trust context) that without a complete release from his
support obligation the husband receives no benefit from his transfer of property to an
alimony trust, and that absent such a benefit he has made no taxable disposition of his
property.
90 See, e.g., Woodsam Assocs. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952) (receipt of




transfers to alimony trusts rest on a fundamentally unsound prem-
ise. Cases defining capital gains and losses using "receipt of a
benefit" to determine whether a disposition is a "sale or ex-
change"91 are not inconsistent with this conclusion. Even if those
cases are correct, a very dubious assumption, 92 they use the "ben-
efit" approach only to classify a taxable disposition, not to deter-
mine whether a disposition has been made. 93
Since recognition of unrealized appreciation depends upon
whether the taxpayer has disposed of property, not upon whether
he has benefited by the disposition, the husband who transfers
appreciated property to an alimony trust in which his wife receives
only an income interest should not be taxed on the appreciation.
Since he has disposed of the income interest, he might be taxed
upon the value of that income interest, with no offset for basis, and
regardless of whether the property has appreciated.94 But even this
limited taxation would be inconsistent with the Code's treatment of
trust alimony and nontrust alimohfy as virtually identical alterna-
tives. Payments from alimony trusts and direct payments must
meet the same tests to be treated as alimony, both kinds of pay-
ments are taxed in full to the wife, without regard to source, and
both reduce (or are excluded from) the husband's taxable in-
come.95 These similarities, the product of a deliberate Congres-
sional decision to treat trust and nontrust alimony alike, justify
9 1E.g., Stokes v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 335, 337 (3d Cir. 1941) (conveyance of
mortgaged property to mortgagee not a "sale or exchange" because mortgagor "gets
nothing").
92 From the taxpayer's point of view there is no difference between giving property to
a creditor and selling the property and giving the creditor the money; if one of these
transactions is a "sale or exchange" both should be. Cf Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d
217 (2d Cir. 1940) (trust had capital gain on securities distributed in satisfaction of be-
quest). Recent cases and rulings involving transactions like that in Stokes v. Commis-
sioner, 124 F.2d 335, 337 (3d Cir. 1941), discussed in note 91 supra, have held, without
explanation, that they are "sales or exchanges." See Bacas, supra note 65, at 105-08.
93 Section 61, which requires the inclusion in income of gain on a disposition of prop-
erty refers to "gains derived from dealings in property," and section 1001, which covers
determination of the amount of gain or loss, covers the "sale or other disposition of prop-
erty." Both these phrases can be read more broadly than "sale or exchange," the phrase
used in § 1222 to describe dispositions that produce capital gains or losses.
" See notes 80-83 and accompanying text supra.
95 The argument in the text applies only to § 71 alimony trusts. In the case of trusts
making payments not covered by § 71, justification for the inapplicability of Davis is found
in the continued taxability to the grantor of the trust's income. See notes 51-69 and accom-
panying text supra. If the income interest has not been transferred to the wife in the sense
of making her taxable on that income, the husband should not be considered to have
disposed of that interest (for tax purposes), and so should not be required to recognize
gain.
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making the creation of an income-interest alimony trust a nontax-
able event, since the parallel situation-the husband's use of income
from property to pay direct alimony-is not taxable. 96
The effect upon the wife of a rule taxing the creator of an
income-interest alimony trust shows the rule's unsoundness. When
a husband makes a taxable transfer of property to his wife, she
takes it with a basis equal to its value at the time of the transfer. 97 If
this rule were applied to the creation of an alimony trust, the wife
would have a basis for her income interest, which she could amor-
tize,98 reducing her taxable income. A wife who is the beneficiary
of an alimony trust would have considerably less taxable income
than one receiving the same amount in direct alimony. As the only
substantial difference between these two wives is that the trust ben-
eficiary is more certain of receiving her payments, granting the
trust beneficiary wife a basis in the trust property should be
avoided if at all possible. This can be done only by making the
transfer a nontaxable event. Furthermore, if the husband is al-
lowed a basis in his income interest, the Service's "benefit" rule can
96 See Comment, Tax Aspects of Alimony Trusts, 66 YALE L.J. 881, 882-85 (1957).
97 See Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947) (wife's basis in
stock transferred to her in consideration for her release of marital rights equal to value at
time of transfer, not husband's basis); Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63.
8 See Spruance v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 141, 155 n.7 (1973) (dictum), affd mzem., 505
F.2d 731 (3d Cir. 1974). The Spruance opinion recognized that the transfer to the wife was a
transfer of an income interest, not simply of an undivided interest in property, as it was
treated in the rulings discussed in the text. Moreover, while the court appeared willing to
let the wife amortize the cost of the income interest, it apparently felt that the trust should
not receive a basis in the income interest on account of the transfer. But the court gave
effect to the Commissioner's concession that the trust's basis should be determined under
Rev. Rul. 57-507 unless estoppel barred the taxpayer from using that stepped-up basis.
O'Byrne, supra note 72, at 69, recognizes that the wife may have a basis, but suggests
that § 71 should prevent amortization in light of the "full inclusion of payments in income"
rule discussed in Part I of this Article. He argues, however, that the wife should be able to
use her basis if she sells her interest. This rule (basis for sale but not for depreciation) is
identical to the rules applicable to holders of donative life estates prior to the enactment of
§ 1001(e) in 1969. Gerhart, supra note 46, argues that § 71 is not inconsistent with amorti-
zation because it is concerned with gross income, not taxable income. But see note 45 supra.
If the husband had to include the full value of the life estate in income, the wife's
lessened taxable income during the time she amortized her interest would be matched by
an increase in the husband's income in the year of the transfer. The husband's gain would
ordinarily be a capital gain under McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 330 U.S. 826 (1947). If, however, he retained a reversionary interest in the
trust, Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958), would probably require ordi-
nary income treatment. Taxing the husband in full would solve the disappearing income
problem, as would reducing the remainderman's basis by the amount of the wife's amorti-
zation deductions, but neither of these solutions is satisfactory. See note 100 infra.
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remove income from the tax base. 99 Suppose, for example, that the
husband establishes an alimony trust using unappreciated prop-
erty, so that even though the Service considers the transaction tax-
able it produces no gain and thus no tax. If the wife's taxable
income is reduced by her amortizable basis in her income interest,
her total taxable income over her life is the amount of the alimony
payments less the value of the right to receive those payments
when the trust was created. If the parties establish an alimony trust,
instead of having the husband keep the property and use the in-
come to pay alimony, the- Service's view of the law enables them to
cause a considerable part of the income from the property to dis-
appear. 10 0 This sort of sorcery has been performed before, with
sales of inherited life estates, 01 where it produced the inevitable
congressional reaction to a scheme too good to be true.'0 2 The
courts can forestall a similar scheme involving alimony trusts if they
avoid the plausible but unsound approach of making taxability
turn upon the "receipt of a benefit."
Although this discussion shows that a husband who establishes
an alimony trust in which the wife has only an income interest
should not be taxed, it does not follow that creation of an alimony
trust should never be a taxable event. If the trust gives the wife an
interest approaching full ownership of the property, such as an
income interest and a testamentary power of appointment over the
corpus,0 3 the husband has for all practical purposes disposed of all
"9 See McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S.
826 (1947) (taxpayer allowed to use her basis in inherited life estate to compute her gain
on sale of her interest to remainderman, even though the predecessor of section 273 would
have forbidden recovery of her basis through amortization deductions).
100 Taxing the husband in full would solve the disappearing income problem; as would
reducing the remainderman's basis by the amount of the wife's amortization deductions,
but neither of these solutions is satisfactory. Taxing the husband would defeat the purpose
of § 71 by returning the tax burden to him, and reducing the remainderman's basis would
be inconsistent with the normal tax treatment of remainder interests. See note 83 supra.
101 Until the enactment of § 1001(e), the holder of a donative or inherited life estate
had no depreciable basis (§ 273), but could use his share of the uniform basis to reduce
gain on a sale of the interest. By selling his interest, such a taxpayer could exchange a right
to future fully-taxable receipts for a lump sum non-taxable (because offset by basis) pay-
ment. For a discussion of this disappearing-income problem before the enactment of
§ 1001(e), see Plumb, Tax Effects of Sales of Life Interests in Trusts, 9 TAx L. REv. 39 (1953).
102 See I.R.C. § 1001(e) (holder of donative or inherited life or term interest must
disregard basis in determining gain or loss from disposition of that interest, except for
dispositions transferring entire interest in property).
103 In Estate of Hundley v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 495 (1969), affd mere., 435 F.2d
1311 (4th Cir. 1971), a gift tax case, a husband who created such a trust reported the
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his interest in the property. Davis requires that he be taxed on that
disposition regardless of any future obligations. 10 4 Intermediate
cases, such as the husband's retention of a reversionary interest
terminable by the wife's power to invade the corpus, could arise.
But at least in the normal divorce, where the parties are not well-
disposed toward each other, these intermediate types of trusts are
unlikely to be used.10 5
An issue closely related to the taxation of transfers of property
to alimony trusts is the taxation of divorce-connected transfers of
income interests in preexisting trusts. Whether Davis requires that
these transfers be taxable events is an open question. Suppose, for
example, that the husband has a life income interest in a trust, and
that he transfers that interest to his wife to satisfy his support
obligation. His interest in the trust can be "property,"'' 0 6 and a
ruthless application of Davis would require that the value of the
transfer of assets to the trustee as a sale on his income tax return, and neither party
questioned that treatment. Id. at 506.
104 See Kraut v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Wis. 1970), discussed in note 84
supra. A transfer to a wife for life, remainder to children will often present a difficult
factual problem: Is the creation of the remainder interest a donative transfer, or is it some-
thing the wife bargained for, making the disposition taxable in full? The courts have faced
a similar problem in estate and gift taxation. Their approach, which could apply in income
tax cases as well, seems to be that the taxpayer can treat a transfer to children as a transfer
to the wife if the evidence supports the conclusion that the transfer was forced upon the
husband. Compare Estate of Glen v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 323 (1966) with Spruance v.
Commissioner, 60 T.C. 141 (1973), aff'd mem., 505 F.2d 731 (3d Cir. 1974). Judge Tan-
nenwald, dissenting in Estate of Glen, would have held that transfers to children should
never be treated as transfers to a wife:
It seems to me that we ought not to involve ourselves in whether the transfers for
the benefit of the son were motivated by the generosity of decedent or that of his
former wife. To do so would be an unwarranted probing of that "elusive state of
mind," which the Supreme Court has held to be contrary to the intent of Con-
gress.
45 T.C. at 351.
One might even argue that the creation of any alimony trust-even one in which the
husband retains a reversionary interest-is a fully taxable event, if the wife insisted on the
transfer. This solution would have the great virtue of simplicity. On the other hand, di-
vorce is not a convenient time to impose a tax, particularly where (as here) the transaction
gives the taxpayer no money with which to pay that tax. Accordingly, although we seem
stuck with Davis for the time being, we should not strain to apply it where less than the
whole interest in the property is being transferred.
105 These types of trusts are also undesirable under current law because of "creation of
income" problems. See notes 46-48 and accompanying text supra.
106 See, e.g., Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937) (donor having only life interest
in trust assigned a portion of that interest; "assignment of income" doctrine did not re-
quire taxing income to donor); McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946)
(sale of life tenant's interest in a trust), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 826 (1947).
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transferred interest be income to the husband.107 Nevertheless,
several courts have dealt with transfers of existing interests without
mentioning this problem, apparently assuming that the transfers
were not taxable. The Tax Court recognized a similar issue in
Daniel v. Commissioner,'0 8 but avoided it by deciding that no interest
in the trust had passed to the wife.' 0 9 Another Tax Court case,
Miller v. Commissioner, 10 held that a husband who transferred his
lessor's interest in a seventy-five year lease to an alimony trust
recognized no gain because the rents were excluded from his in-
come by section 71(d)."' Since the effects of transferring an in-
come interest in an existing trust and of transferring property to a
new trust in which the wife has an income interest are substantially
identical, transfers of existing income interests should be held
nontaxable. Alimony treatment for transferred income interests
draws support from the same factors that support alimony treat-
ment for payments by alimony trusts,'"2 is consistent with the lan-
guage of section 71, and can be achieved only by making the trans-
fers nontaxable. Davis did not appear to consider transfers of bare
income interests, and it should not be extended to cover these
107 Unless the taxpayer had purchased the interest, he would have no basis to subtract
from sales receipts when computing his gain. § 1001(e). See notes 101-02 and accompany-
ing text supra. The gain could be a capital gain. See McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d
235 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 826 (1947).
108 56 T.C. 655 (1971), affd mem., 461 F.2d 1265 (5th Cir. 1972), discussed in notes
54-56 and accompanying text supra. Before arguing that § 682(a) required taxing the
"non-section 71" payments to the wife, Daniel argued that he had "transferred" his income
interest in a trust to his wife and was not taxable under Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5
1937). See note 106 supra.
109 Although the divorce court had impressed a lien upon the trust income, the Tax
Court found that this lien had not transferred any interest in the trust to the wife. 56 T.C.
at 659.
110 49 T.C. 484 (1968), acq. 1969-2 C.B. xxiv.
111 Although the result in Miller is consistent with the conclusion reached in the text,
the court's reasoning is not comforting. The opinion stressed that no property had been
transferred to the wife, and suggested that the Commissioner's argument for taxing the
value of the transferred lease to the husband might have been accepted if the lease had
been transferred outright to the wife, rather than held in trust for her. Id. at 487-88. But
where only an income interest is involved, there is no substantial difference between an
outright transfer to the wife and payment via a trustee. So formal a distinction should not
distinguish Miller from cases of the kind discussed in the text. In Wright v. Commissioner,
37 T.C.M. (CCH) 372 (1978), the divorce court had awarded a wife a ten-year leasehold
estate in her husband's interest in certain rental property. The taxpayer (the wife) argued
that the income she received was not taxable to her because the transfer was, a property
settlement rather than alimony. The Tax Court, rejecting this argument and a contention
that the payments were not "periodic," held her taxable on the payments under section 71.
112 See notes 95-102 and accompanying text supra.
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transfers. As with trusts created in connection with divorce, how-
ever, a transfer of an interest that gives the wife full ownership of
the trust corpus or its near-equivalent may be taxable under Davis.
CONCLUSION
The error of the Supreme Court in Douglas v. Wilicuts, and of
the Service in its application of that case's doctrine to current prob-
lems, is not merely that the distinction between trusts whose crea-
tion "discharges" the husband's obligation and other trusts is hard
to apply. The real problem is that any attempt to resolve questions
by asking which spouse "benefits" from the creation of a trust must
fail, for both benefit: he because his obligation is being (or will be)
satisfied, at least in part; she because she gets (or will get) money.
In effect, the Service has been using a multiple-choice test in which
both choices are right. The inevitable result of asking an absurd
question has been the drawing of arbitrary lines. When Congress
dealt with alimony trusts in 1942, it recognized that creation of
such a trust is merely a secure way of providing for alimony pay-
ments. Acceptance of this sensible view would put an end at last to
the unfortunate doctrine of Douglas v. Willcuts, and to the problems
caused by Congress's careless draftsmanship when it overruled
that case.
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